RECOGNITION OF STATES AND GOVERNMENTS

Brunson i\lacChcsncy
TIll! problems involved in the ~lJbjeel of reeognition in international law arc imporlant onC8, cv{~n though they laek the dramatie appeal of such topie:-: a~ war and pea!:e, ouler ~paee, and on'an ~I'aee. Sim'l' :;tale:; an' lhc basic unil:; in lhl' inll'rnalional legal sY'otem, rl'l"o)!nition plays a vilal roll' in tlw deterlninalion of 1 he qualified actors in tlw :;ysll'm. Similarly. whal govern IIIl'nl rl'pn':;('nl:; a ,.;lall' i~ a :;i/!:nifil'anl maltl'r.
~ lorl'o\'('r. t hI' e)l.('h·i:;(' of juri:;didion hy all(,~l'd :;lale:; and /!:ovcrnnH'nl::: may dl'pcnd for its l'ffeeli\'el\(~~s on reco/!:nition. The ~uhjcct is not an ea~y one to explain or undersland. There is a vast amount of state practice that is rar from l'!lIIsist(~nt, a clash of doctrinal explanalion. and a hewildl'ring variety of tcnninolo~y.
I{('('o)!nilion involVl's thc que:
;lion of what altitude :;;tal('~ will take with 1'1'-ganl to a variety of factual situation:; and th(' legal con:::el)uenees that !low frolll formal rccognition of the$(~ situaliol1~. a::: wl·1I a::: I' Will llll' 110Ill'l'l'o/!:nitiol1 of :;Ul'h $ilualion:;. i\lajor an'a:; !:onl"l'r11 the exisLelll'c of slate:;, governments. war, neutrality, hclligcrcney, and the erfect of nonrecognition of illegal claims to territory. The primary rocus of this lecture will 'be 011 the problems arisin/!: out of recognition and nonrecognition of statcs and governnH'nts.
The requisites for statehood in international law have heen formulated in various ways, hut thcre is substantial agreement that tl)(~re llIust be an independent govel'llment exereh;ing effective authority within a relatively welldefined an:a. The major doctrinal eontroversy has hl'en whether a IWW ('ntity with these eharaeteri:::ties lweonw:; a Slate only through recognition by the existing states in thc world co""nunity, or whether the attainment of the relJuisite factual characteristics by a new entity makes it a state prior to any recognition by existing states? In the books, the controversy is referred to as one betwcen the constitutive and declaratory theories of recognition.
The traditional constitutive theory has heen that new entities do not beeollle states until they arc recognized; i.e., that only recognition eonsLitutc~ tire state, and tlrat each exiHLin~ sl"te is under no duty to recognize a new 1'lItity that Iras allailll'd the rt'ljl,i:;ite flletual eharactcristics. III the absence of any procedures for collective recognition of a new entity, this mcant that an entity might be n'eo~ni1.l'd hy ~onH! ~tatl's bul not by olhcrs. A furthcr thcoretical consequence was that the new entity, if unrecognized, was not a subjcct of international law and therefore allegedly had no rights or obligations under international law.
The late Professor Lauterpacht made an important modifieation in constitutive theory by arf!uing that existing state~ were undl'r a duly to n'('of!nize a new entity lhat mel lhl' requisilc fadual charaderistics. His book on rccognition elahorates his argument and purports to find ~upport for it in state praetice. IIi:; aq.(uml'nt, if al'c"plt'd in practicl', would do much lo obviate lhl' po:;:;ibililil':; of an cnlity lwing recogni1.ed by somc slales and not by others. It would introduce order into a vital aspect of in ternational relations. It would also, if :;imilarly acceptl'll, decrease the praetical importance of an entity thcoretically not subjcct to rights and dutics under international law .
tinder the declaratory theory, an entity which allains the requisite factual eharaeteristies therehy commences its existence a:; a state under international law without the need of rceognition by exi:;ting slal!~s and is accordingly from that point forward a subjcct of inll'rnational law with all thc rights and duties of a slale. Hecognilion, under this theory, serves only to declare what already existed and to indicate a willingness on the part of the recognizing state lo accord the recognized state the privileges of a state. This is normally accompanied hy the opening of diplomatic relations between the two states. Under this theory the recognizing state is also under no duty to recognize the ncw entity, but, since, under thal theory, the entily is almady a statc, the concl'ptnal and practical diffil'ulties pOH'd by thl' conSlitutive theory do nol The problem of recognition of states obviously occurs less frequently than the questioll of recognition of governments. Although occasionally a new sLate has emerged from a territory not previow;ly organized as a staLe, the more typical issue arises out of an allcml'L hy a rebel group to secede from a parent staLe, either in part of its existing territory, or in what was formerly, for example, a colonial terri Lory . In this context it is easy to UlulersLand why premature recognition was an offense.
As previously indicaLed, the generally an:el'Led test of statehood is thaL of an illdl'IHmdl'lIt govl'rnnll'lII I'xl'rl'i:;illg I'ffectiv{! authoriLy within a relalively 11t:-fined arl'a. Implil'il in thl$l! rl'quirt,-ments, or possibly an allllitiollal criterion, is that it reasonably appears that t hl$l! reI( uirenwnls will I:onl illlill 10 III' satisfied. TIll: practice of tlw lInitl!d States until recent times has been fairly consistent in the application of this test to new entities seeking statehood. It is perhaps best illustrated in tIl<: eourse of our recognition of the new states in Latin America in the early 19th century. The United Kingdom has, until recent timcs, also followed essentially the same policy. Since World War II our action with rcspect to tl\(: governnwnt of Comlllunist China, and the alleged· states and governments of East Gl'rlIIan)" North Korea, and North Vielnam has hel!l\ hased on diffl!rent l'on~illl'ra tions. A~ Kaplan and Kutzenhuch point out, reeognition, or rather nonrecognition, in relation to the opposing bloc, is primarily a political weapon. In tIll! ah!ll~nee of an ovcrall 8eLtlenll'nL, tlll'se oLllI'r allel-(ed I-(overllnll!nts allll !llutel:' 81~I:m rt~a~olla('ly permalll'nt, yl'l WI: will continue to witlrhold rccognition. Although, after Worlll War I, the IJlw::otion of reeol!nition of tire ~ovil't (;OVCrllIlll!nt was not. technically, a mall{'r or reco~nition of a state, their IIra:;tic break with tlrc pal:'t lIIade it a similar Ijue::otion in policy terms.
Since World War I L anll I'arlieularly in reGent year:;, our prat:lil'l: willr rC81'I'et to the ret:ognition of new l:'tatl'l:' in ,\fro-Asia has al::;o hCI'n (,a~I!11 on different criteria. lIere, the rapill ending of colonialism and tire plannell Im'paration of new stall'S for illllt'pl!ndl!lH:I'. either unrler the auspicI:::O of lhe Unitl'd Nations or by the parcnt powers such as England and Francc, has led to almo::ot instantaneous recognition or even recognition prior to official independence. As Kuplan and Katzenhaelr point out, COIIIpetition with the ~oviet Union was eertainly a faetor. Mort'ovl:r, frt'lJllently no rt!al eonsideration wus ~ivI'n to lhe I'rospr:cLs of pl'rnl<llIl'l1I:Y of II\(: nl'w stutl'S, nor 10 tire essl'nliul cffectivem'ss of their rt':rimes.
The n'cognilion of govern lIIen Lo; rai~es signifiranlly different i~ues. The 8hllt~. aln~lIIly re~l:ogni1.I'd, conlinue:s lo cxist as a slall: and lhl: Ilucslion is whl!lhl~r a parlicular nlhrlmc is the govcrnment of thal slalc. In the normal and rouline: eascs of changes of governmenl, no el'lIlslion or need of recognilion arises. Il is in cases of revolulionary chanw: where thrre arc at le:ast two eOlllpl'linl! c1aimanls thal lhc issue heIIOnle:; ;wlIle. While lhen' might hI' saill lo bl: a pre'sumplion in favor of lhl: I't:lablislll'd governmenl, onee lhl're: 1\II~ues a genuine civil war, the onlcollw of whirh it: douhlful. lhen the allilude of ollll'r t:lale'~ lowards the l'lainmlll:; bl'l'IlI111'S imporlanl. It is for Ihis silualion Ihal lhl' mh,s wilh re'spl:t'l 10 rCl'ognilion of gOVl'rIImenls arc .11'-signed, As prc:\'iOlI8Iy noll'd, during lhc civil slrllgl-lle lhl: righL<; and ohligalions of thc slatl: l'onlinllll. Tlw i:;,;lIl: is which eOIllpclinl-l c1aimanl represe'nls that sLale for L1w purpose of eonlinuily. In the case of IWW govcrrllnenls, the lIIinimum inlernaliouallaw reei uimment for rccognilion is lhal L1w n:ginw is in c:rfeclive conlrol of lhl: territory ano populalion of thc statl:, or, more conlroversially, conlrols a suhslantial part of lhe: populalion and le'rrilory, and il is rl'asonably dl'ar it will SUI'(\I'I'd in displal'ing Ihl' prl'vinm; govl'rnnwnl. Thl: lalli'" alte:rnalivl: ohvionsly misl:s ddicall: qucslions of judgmcnt. and the possiuililes of premalure n~eognitiCJn are apparent. A slale: lhat n'I'ogni1.I's a nllW rc'gillll' on this minimUIII ha:::i::: of I'ffl'clivl'lil'ss lIIay be saio lo follow a de facto policy of n:eognilion. Thl: Uniled Slales. however. c10es not accept this as the solc tcst and in theory rcquircs. in addition, lhat the rehel regiml: giVl: m3surances lhat it will honor thl: ohIigaliom; of the slate undcr inll'rnaliollal law and applicahll: inlernalional agl'l:I'nllmls. Inmon: modern liml's, parlicnlarly in IIII' ea:;e of Ihe Spanish Civil War. a prill:tiee was devdoped. 1'~pI:I:ial\y hy the Uniled King-693 dom, of abandoning an either/or approach and treating a revolulionary rc:ginH: as Ihl: l'ffl'I:live: rc:gime in parlof lhe territory of a slale. This is what the United Kingdom did wilh respel:llo the Franco forcI~s prior lo the conclusion of that civil war.
Ln carlicr times various other additional conditions for recognition were advanced. During the monarchical era sOllie aLlcmpls lo insist on legilimaey of sut:cl·:.<,;ion were malic:, hut proved inl'ffl'c:lual. It is pallmt why this was so. It is the rl'volulionary change: that .... ise:; Ihe prohle'm, and rc:volulion is invariahly i\ll'~al IlIlller the law of lhe ,;Iall' in q ueslion. But revolulion is not ill"gal ulllh·,· inll'rnalional law. Thl' inIt'rnaliollal law sy:.<lt·m is nol organi1.l'd lo ilOlil:e Ihl! inlernal n:lalion,; of its memhers. III the Tilloco 1\ rbitration, Chief Juslice Taft, liS sole arbilralor, made this point explicilly. lie also hdd in thatl:asl: lhat, frolll the slandpoint of an international trihunal. lhl' lesl of effeclivencss determines which government has eapacity to hind the slale.
Another reason oeeasionally invoked for denying recognilion is oh:icl:lion lo thc inhumane methods cmployed hy tlH: rehcl faelion as distin~uished frolll lheir iIIegilimate orip;in. Inslances arc (;"reat Brilain's aLlitudl' loward the French Hevolution. and the alliluc\e of lhe Uniled Slales and others toward lhe inilial gt:i1.l1re of power by thl' Soviels. Bill lhis. too. does not provc lo be effeclive in an international syslcm wilhoul power 10 dl'al wilh oUlrageous condllc:L hy wdl-eslabli:.<hed regimes. lo say nOlhing of rc:vollllionary regimes. Only an cffective! world govcrnment will be able lo cxcreise sueh a power, and present prospects for such a development arc nol eneourap;ing.
!{e:ferencc has alreadv hecII made lo lhl' Uniled Slates additional condilion for rC'col!"ilion. 11l1llH'ly. Ihal Ihe: rl'gimt: ill qurslion illdiralr:.< il,; willinl!lll'~ lo fulfill ils oblil!alions uneIe-.. inlernalional law and applieablc: inlerualional al-,rrel'-IIIents. This policy was not ori!!inally followed .. kfferson stated in connection wiLh til(' Fn~r)(:h \{evolutioll that our policy was to rcco~lIil'.e allY ~overrlJllI'ut "which is fornwd by the will of the natioll', suhstantially declared." SOllie have asserted that, except for the Wilsonian illterlude to he melltioned later, this policy has heell consistcntly followed. Lauterpaeht refers to it as. in ess\'nce, a rcquiremellt of the eOIlSt'IIt of the !!overned ill ordt'r to demollstratc that the re~ime will he effeetiVl" wit h prospeeL" of permanellcy. lie further asserts that hoLh the United States alld the Ullited Kinl!dom pur""l'd thit< policy with fair consisll'lIc), until the elld of thl' fin;t Wmld Wilr. Ohviously, the tl'~1 is fill' fmm preei~I' alld was variously inll'rprl'll'd in pral'liee. In SOInl' illstances it ealled for free dl'elions,. while in olher,; popular eOllscnt was inferred Oil Ihc basis of very inconclusive evideneeindeed.
Presidenl Wilson added to the principle, especially in connection with Latin America, the further test of constitulionality under the law of the state ill question. l\loreovcr, thc Unitcd Statcs, although not a party, supporLed the Central-Amcriean Treaties of J <)07 and 1 <)2;~ in relation to the parties therclo. These treaties embodied' a eonslilulional test and additional restrictiolls. Suhseq uelltl)', in tlw 1I0over ad mi nistra tion, the eonsti tutional test was ahandoned, and we purported to revert to the .I effersl.lnian policy. II 1':111 he said Ihal. followinl! World \\ ar I. the n:lJuirenwllt or popular I'onsent was gradually abandoned hy hoth the United States and the United K ingdom in the face of the rise of dictatorial governmenls exercising effective power. This neccssarily brid survey of varying allitude" of the United Slatcs should not suggest that anyone test has necessarily been consistently applied in any pl'riod. 'fhi" i" ('l'rlainly lrue at the prescnt lillle. WI' wOllld appear to have several policies. In Latin A IIwrica we have developed a practice or informal consultatioll wiLh the other members of IIII' ()r:.~anil'.alion or AIIlI'ril':1II Slalt'!\ with n'sJlI~el 10 till! reeognilion or dl! faciO governlllellts in L1ral an'a. Whill~ thc eOllsultation is collecLiv(~, thl~ individual m(~mber slate rctains Lire powcr of ultimate decision. In the Resolution of the OAS emhodying this procedure, it is interestinl! to note Lhat sLress is laid on free clections and willingness to honor intl'rnational ohlil!ations as the principal criteria to he lak(m inLo ae-(,Ollnt. On the other hand, in rdation to the COlllmunisL blo(~ or hloes, our policy wilh res(ll't:I to n'eol!nitioll of /!OVl'rnIllellis. jusl as ill thl' ('a~I' of III'W COII\lllullisL slall's, has hel'lI l!0V('I'I\('t1 hy polilil'al ('llllsitll'raLiolls in the context of Ihl' "('old war."
Bdore prOl:eetlillg to nonrecognition, it might he useful to refer bridly to thl~ modes, or lIIeLhods, of reeoglli tioll. Thl: state or governmcnt seckillg recognition obviously wanls to inLerpret mosL ravorably to itself any ambiguous statement or action of other governments that might imply recognitioll. On the other hand, the state eomtelllplaLing recogllition wishes to control Lhe process. Since it is, 1II0re typically, smaller or weaker states, or the governments thereof, that arc seeking recognition, it is the major nations tllat have insisted that recognition is a maLter of intention and that allY ambiguous act which might imply recognition may be negated by a disclaimer of intention to recognize.
CerL:lin formal acts clearly eonstiLute recognition, such as an exchange or reception of ambassadors, or the conclusion of a bilateral treaty. Appointment and reception of consuls, on the other hand, does not resulL in recognition although lhe re(plest for and issll:lnee of an exequatur probably docs. In the case of mulLilateral Ireaties, it is, however, generally al!recd that participaLing as a party thereLo along with an unrecognil'.ed state or government c10es not constitutc recognition. The same view prevails with respect to participating in internaLional conferenccs wiLh unrecognized rcgimes. Although thcre was some original difference of opinion with respect to memhership in the League of Nations, expecially when the allegedly recognizing state voted for admission, it came to be accepted, and is accepted in the United Nations, that admission to mcmhership docs not imply reeognition on the part of other members that the entity in question is heing recognized, apart from memhership, as a state or government. The practical reasons for these last few conclu~ions are ohvious. Any oLher view would p:lralyzc Llw proc:c:.sscs and in:::LiLuLions involved.
The c:lution of rccognizing sLuLes, howevcr, even in these :lreas, is iIIusLmted hy :I recent example. The Nuclear Tc:::t-Ban Treaty provid(:(1 th:lt LIII: UniL(!d SLates, till! Unitcd Kingdom, and Lhe Sovict Union should c:lch III: a (1('spo~iLary and it was clearly understood that East Germany's deposit of its declaration of acccssion to the Trcaty with the Soviet Union would have no effect on its continucd nonrecognition hy the other depositaries. The United States conLention that East Germany would nonctheless he hound by their accession to the Treaty is more controver:::iaI.
I f we accept intention as the decisive test, many in formal reiaLions with unrecognized regimes arc possible, such as negotiations, tempor:lry miliLary agreenllmLs, :lnd contilllmncc of trmli:. Our v:lriolls d(,alings with the Chinese Communist Government arc a recent demonstraLion of this practice, and there are many other similar cases. This possihility of maintaining informal relations wiLh unrecognized regimcs makes more palatahle and practical the policy of nonrecognition of slates and governmcnts which mect the criLeria for those sLaLuses, I>e:;pitc a theoreLicalll'gal void, tl,,:re is an expedient accommodation to the Jlrohli~m.
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Turning "to the phcnomcnon of nonn'('ol-(niLion of statcs and governnwnt~, what ,If(' till: Icgal eonS(:'1II1'nC(!:; in international and uOlllcstic law'! lVlany of the important conscquences arc in domestic law, so that hcre we shall be considering "foreign relations law" as well as international law, strictly speaking. Accepting the declaratory theory as in accordance with the practice of states, we have states and governments which meet the criteria for recognition but arc not recognizeu. What arc the respective rights and duties between the cxisting entities and such unrecognized cnliLil':;?
BI'f,'rrinp; Lo our previous disl'II::::;ion of informal n'lalions, we :;l'C thaI :;oml' rdaLious lIIay :lnd do t:lke pl:lee bet wecn thelll. Speaking p;enerally, thc unrecognized entity, be it slate or governnwnt, whieh has lIIeL LI\(! requisiLe criteri:l, has the rights of a staLe in international I:lw, although it e:ln be prevente(l from exercising them if the rights can only he exerei:;etl hy a slate, and the nonrecognizing sLate refuses to treat the purported ex(~rcise as the action of the government of Lhe oLlwr :lHeged state. Tlw 8:1nH! raLionale eontrois with rt!8pect Lo Lhe obligatons of such an entity. The qlH:stions mainly arise with respect to unreeogniz('tl I!0V-ern meuts rathl'r than slatl's. I t is clt'ar that tlw nonrecognition of a pilrtieular governnll!nt tloe~ not tlepriv,! till: sLaLe of its righLs or relieve it of its tllltil!s under interniltiO/wllaw undl!r Lhe conditions ~lillt'd. This i::: a l'on!<clp\(!nCI' of the continuity of states.
Thc previous statemcnts dealt with established rights and oblig:ltions. But an unrt!cogni~ed regime meeting the Iwress:lry criteria can also creall~ new right:; mul ohligations with res(let:L to iI sLate th:lt has not reeol!nized it. In the Tinoco Arbitration previously mentioned, the effective government in Co:>la Hieil (lhl' Tinol'o Con-mlllent) was hdd Lo hilvl! hound LhaL slaLe in n'laLion Lo (:r('at Brilain whieh h:l::: not reeognized LhaL governmenL. I\.s Chief .J usLice TafL poinLed oliL in his opinion, Lhe usc of nonmeognition as a polilieal weapon drm;tieally reduces its vailic as evidence of the nonexistence of an effective regime. l'arenLlu:tically, it should he mentioned thaL a recogni)l;ed regime, even though no longer in control of sOllie or all of its former Lerritory, continues with its rights and ohligations and may create new rights and obligations with nationals of another state still [('cognizing it, with respect to areas outside of the rehel regime's eonLrol. Thus, the puhlie assets of a state with sueh a recognized rqdlllt:, til(! a~sd~ Iwing 10-eated within a staLe ["('cognizing it. will he awarded by the courts of that recognizing ~tate to the recogni)l;ed government. This was the LreatmenL accorded hy tlu: eourts of II,,· recognizing states to the a:;:;<:Is, wiLhin thosc recognizing states, 0 f the I!0vernmcnls-in-exilc during World War ll. Furthermore, if a state has one regime which is being recognized as de jure ancI another as de facto at the same time by a reeogni)l;ing state, the courts of that state will award the public funds to the de jILre regime. Two BriLish dl'ei~ions concerned wiLh Lhe recognition of Ethiopian claims in England turned on this distineLion, which demom;tratl's thaI. for domestic law OIL least, wlll'tlu'r reeogniLion is de fac·to or elC! jUre! lIIakes a ~igniri(:ant difl'eren(:(!.
The firsL decision held thaL the Emperor, as the ruler ele jUre!, was entitled to eollc'("L a deht which had at:cmed before the recognition of the King of Italy as the ruler de facto. When England subsequently recognized the King of Italy as the ruler de jllre, in the same easc on appeal, it was held that the: King was Lhen entitled to c:ollecL the dehL.
We have heen discussing the rulcs rdating to unrecognized regimcs meeting tlw relevant criteria. WhaL of the rights and obligations of unrt'('ogni1.('d revolutionary r('gilll(,s LhaL do noL nled till' tesls for an d'fec:live governlllenL either OIL the Lime of acting or suhsequenLly? Such regimes do not have any g(!IH'ral ("lIpac:ity lo erellt(: rights and ohligations in relation to another :;tall~, huL inLernaLional law docs recogni1.e a limiLed capacity Lo validatc acls performed in a territory within its control and relating to routine governmental administration raLher than in support of its own ljuest for conLrol of the sLate it purports to represcnt. I\.n inLernational arhiLral decision to this effeeL held Lhat the sale hy such a regime of a po~tal money order was binding on the state and its successor recognized governmenL.
Finally, whal is till! l'ff(:d of SUh8('-'Im'nt f('('ognition of a ~tat(: or gov\'rnment thaL hau previously met the requisite criLcria·? l{ecognition releases lhe restrictions that hau prcviously existcd as to righLs and ohligations thaL Iwd required aeknowledgmcnt tlll'reof hy the reeogni)l;ing state. The furlher qucstion of whether recognition is retroactive with respect to acts perforJIH'd before recognition but after meeting lhe requisiLe criteria is not governed hy international la'r. This follows from acceptance of the theory that there is no duty to recognize even when lhe requisite critcria exist. Ilowever, retroactiviLy is si{!niricanL in the internal law of the recognizing staLe, and the scope of the principle will be developed in the suhsequent discussion of tlw donwsti(: legal consequences of recognition a 1111 nonreeogniLion.
WiLhdrawal of n:cognition is anollll'r maller which should be brieflv canvassed. In Lheory, if a sLaLe or a government fails lo maintain the requisite criteria, then wiLhdrawal of recognilion is appropriate. In praeLice, withdrawal normaUv occurs when a new state replaces the previously rccognized state, or a new governmenL is recognized in place of the preeeding one. The pn~-8uJIlption as to the existing authority applies here. Until 11 new state or governmenL meets the requisiLe eriLeria, wiLhdrawal of previous recognition would he inappropriale. SOnH! authoriti(!s add, however, thal withdrawal is appropriate if the inilial n-eognition was tentative--i.e., de facto--and the requisite criteria have not materialized. The !testatcment of Foreign 1{e1ations Law states that no instance of withdrawal of recognition has heen found except in thc si tuaLions ahove mentioned.
In theory, wiLhdrawal should not hc baSI-II on disapproval of a recognized regime_ buL ollly on f'lilurt-to maintuin the req uisil<-criLeria. I n fact, sLaLes disapproving of u previously recogniz(-(I regillH! do not withdmw rccognition hut s!wer diplonUltic relaLions. For cxample, Gn-at BriL<lill recognized the Soviet Union de facto mlll subt<e!luently eI(· jure and <l few years later scvered diplomaLi!: relations. lIere, therc is a legal curiosity. Severance of diplorllatic relations docs not present many of the problems thought to arise out of nonreeognition. In the Sabbatillo case, the U.S. Supreme Court sq uarcly held that the Castro Cuban Government, as a government that the United States had recognized, could sue in the courts of the United States, despite the severance of diplomatic relations prior to the litigation, even though the established rule is that an unrecognized government can not so sue.
As previously mentioned, some of tire most significant legal consequences arising out of nonrecognition are governed by domcstic or national law as distinguished from international law. Tn earlier ref!!rence to L II!!' recognizing state, it was assumed that, for international purposes, it was the executive braneh of the govcrnment of that state that made the deeision. [n the domestic sense, the recognizing organ is a political braneh of the government. The judicial branch is not involved. This does not mean that the executive's action is not subject lo legal restrainls. On the olher Irand. the judiciary Iras a significanl role Lo play on the donH:stic scene. as 697 distinguished from the international arena. The main problem for the domestie judieiary is whaL staLm; should 1)(' gl"Hllted to <llld whaL erf!:ct should h!~ given to actions of an entity not recognized by their executive. The complex and extensive domestic law on this subject can only he summarized, and the discussion will be confined to the domestic law of the United States and the United Kingdom. In what follows it is assumed that the unrecognized entity Iras. in fnel. mel the re!prisitc internationaleriteria.
In the United Kingdom, as wcll as in the Uniled Slates, an unrecognizcd governmcnt does not have access Lo tIll! eour~s as :l plaintiff. On the furth!-.· !(Ilestion of wheLher an unrecognized govcrnment is entitled to immunity as a defendant, some decisions in the United States have granted immunity, contrary t() the British view. Our hoMings can be cxplained on the ground that the state, as such, is entitled to claim immunity. i\ different result would he reached if there were also a recognized government in existence, which could waive the immunity on behalf of the state.
\Iost of the interesting questions involve the issue of what effect the courts should give to legislation and other action of an unrecognized government. The British decisions have drawn quite rigidly the logical deduction that no effect should be given in their courts to action of a regime unrecognized by tire British Government. Thus, if the claimants in the Tilloco case had brought suit in a Brili~h eourt ralher than in an international tribunal, the acts of the effective government in Cosla Rica would not have bcen "recognized." Even Lauterpacht, who defends the British position, concedes that it is workable only so long as the executive hranch accords rccognition under his theory that there is a legal duty to rccognize cntitit-s meelinp; the rcquisile critl!ria. The 14 years of Ilonrecognilioll of the Soviet Government hy the Unitl!d
